SOE in The Netherlands  
The Special Operations Executive’s Dutch Section in WW2
Published by Pen and Sword
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ISBN: 9781036110871
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Until 1943 there was little effective resistance to the German occupation of The Netherlands. Though numerous small opposition groups had formed immediately after the German invasion in 1940, there was no concerted movement or over-arching organization.

Gradually, though, as the Germans introduced harsher measures against certain groups, opposition grew, particularly in the urban areas. These met with very limited success due to poor security which was to plague the Dutch resistance movement in general. As is made clear in this official account, individuals were often members of more than one resistance group at the same time. This inevitably meant that when one cell was compromised others quickly met the same fate.

Nevertheless, in 1941 the Netherlands, or N, Section of the Special Operations Executive under Major Seymour Bingham started sending trained agents to The Netherlands. These operatives were dropped by parachute or infiltrated into the country from France or Belgium. Unfortunately, poor discipline continued to hamper the resistance movement. Preparation was poor, security was lax, and codewords were forgotten or ignored. As a result, fifty-four of N Section’s agents were captured by the Germans; fifty of these were subsequently executed.

Despite its egregious failings, SOE’s N Section, could count on some successes. Its agents were able to coordinate the various groups and help maintain communications with the UK. They also undertook valuable weapons training and gave instruction on demolition techniques.

The people the agents assisted in active resistance were usually ordinary Dutch citizens, often working in respectable jobs under the very noses of the Germans, their only precaution being the adoption of a false name while operating undercover. The SOE agents themselves had to adopt the cover occupations of those professions which would not be subjected to conscription, such as teachers, medical personnel, or police. Usually, they would take the identity of brave individuals who had volunteered to have their information duplicated. In addition, the agents would be thoroughly briefed on their adopted personas so that they could provide convincing accounts of their movements if stopped and interrogated.

This official account of the development and activities of SOE’s Dutch Section was written by a Staff Officer prior to SOE being disbanded in 1946. It was based on information, reports and documents provided by those involved in the campaign.

It details how SOE agents were recruited and trained in the UK and gives information on safe houses, contact addresses, secret telephone exchanges, training premises and methods of communications in The Netherlands and externally to London. In essence, it provides all the apparatus and procedures used in the establishment of the underground movement which sought to obstruct and oppose the Germans at every turn.
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Description
Until 1943 there was little effective resistance to the German occupation of The Netherlands. Though numerous small opposition groups had formed immediately after the German invasion in 1940, there was no concerted movement or over-arching organization.

Gradually, though, as the Germans introduced harsher measures against certain groups, opposition grew, particularly in the urban areas. These met with very limited success due to poor security which was to plague the Dutch resistance movement in general. As is made clear in this official account, individuals were often members of more than one resistance group at the same time. This inevitably meant that when one cell was compromised others quickly met the same fate.

Nevertheless, in 1941 the Netherlands, or N, Section of the Special Operations Executive under Major Seymour Bingham started sending trained agents to The Netherlands. These operatives were dropped by parachute or infiltrated into the country from France or Belgium. Unfortunately, poor discipline continued to hamper the resistance movement. Preparation was poor, security was lax, and codewords were forgotten or ignored. As a result, fifty-four of N Section’s agents were captured by the Germans; fifty of these were subsequently executed.

Despite its egregious failings, SOE’s N Section, could count on some successes. Its agents were able to coordinate the various groups and help maintain communications with the UK. They also undertook valuable weapons training and gave instruction on demolition techniques.

The people the agents assisted in active resistance were usually ordinary Dutch citizens, often working in respectable jobs under the very noses of the Germans, their only precaution being the adoption of a false name while operating undercover. The SOE agents themselves had to adopt the cover occupations of those professions which would not be subjected to conscription, such as teachers, medical personnel, or police. Usually, they would take the identity of brave individuals who had volunteered to have their information duplicated. In addition, the agents would be thoroughly briefed on their adopted personas so that they could provide convincing accounts of their movements if stopped and interrogated.

This official account of the development and activities of SOE’s Dutch Section was written by a Staff Officer prior to SOE being disbanded in 1946. It was based on information, reports and documents provided by those involved in the campaign.

It details how SOE agents were recruited and trained in the UK and gives information on safe houses, contact addresses, secret telephone exchanges, training premises and methods of communications in The Netherlands and externally to London. In essence, it provides all the apparatus and procedures used in the establishment of the underground movement which sought to obstruct and oppose the Germans at every turn.
Table of contents
  • Cover
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Publisher’s Note
  • Introduction
    • Situation on Establishment vis-à-vis The Netherlands Authorities
    • Nature of Dutch Official Circles
    • Recruiting
    • Preliminary Reconnoitring
    • Personnel
  • Chapter 1 1941
    • Agents Sent September 1941
    • Agents Sent October 1941
    • Agents Sent November 1941
    • Agents Sent December 1941
  • Chapter 2 1942
    • Dutch Section, General
    • Relations with the Dutch Authorities
    • Outline of Planning for the Field in 1942
    • Special Note re Operation Parsley
    • Actual Position in the Field during 1942
    • Agents Sent January 1942
    • Agents Sent February 1942
    • Operation Carrot
    • Agents Sent March 1942
    • Operation Turnip
    • Operation Watercress
    • Operation Lettuce
    • Agents Sent April 1942
    • Operation Leek
    • Operation Potato
    • Agents Sent May 1942
    • Operation Beetroot
    • Agents Sent June 1942
    • Operation Spinach
    • Operation Parsnip
    • Operation Marrow
    • Agents Sent July 1942
    • Operation Leek A
    • Agents Sent August 1942
    • Agents Sent September 1942
    • Operation Kale
    • Operation Mangold
    • Operation Parsley
    • Operation Cauliflower
    • Agents Sent October 1942
    • Operation Cabbage
    • Operation Celery
    • Operation Pumpkin
    • Operation Tomato
    • Operation Cucumber
    • Operation Broccoli
    • Agents Sent November 1942
    • Operation Mustard
    • Operation Chive
    • Agents Sent December 1942
    • Operations 1942 Totals
  • Chapter 3 1943
    • Dutch Section, General
    • Relations with the Dutch Authorities
    • Outline of Planning for the Field in 1943
    • Agents Sent January 1943
    • Agents Sent February 1943
    • Operation Endive
    • Operation Radish
    • Operation Parsley A
    • Operation Hockey
    • Operation Tennis
    • Operation Golf
    • Operation Broadbean
    • Operation Lacrosse
    • Agents Sent March 1943
    • Operation Kohlrabi
    • Operation Seakale
    • Operation Sprout
    • Agents Sent April 1943
    • Operation Gherkin
    • Operation Netball
    • Agents Sent May 1943
    • Operation Croquet
    • Operation Squash
    • Operation Polo
    • Agents Sent June 1943
    • Agents Sent July 1943
    • Agents Sent August 1943
    • Agents Sent September 1943
    • Operation Soccer
    • Agents Sent October 1943
    • Operation Badminton
    • Operation Rugger
    • Agents Sent November 1943
    • Agents Sent December 1943
      • Actual Position in the Field During 1943
      • Notes on Dutch Clandestine Organisations, 1941-1943
      • Orde Dienst (O.D.)
      • R.V.V. (Raad van Verzet - Council of Resistance)
      • C.S.VI
      • The “Illegal Press”
      • Operations 1943 Totals
      • Dutch Section Financial Report, December 1940 to December 1943
    • Chapter 4 1944
      • General Situation, January and February 1944
      • General Situation, March 1944
      • General Situation, April 1944
      • General Situation, May 1944
      • General Situation, June 1944
      • General Situation, July 1944
      • General Situation, August 1944
      • General Situation, September 1944
      • General Situation October 1944
      • General Situation November 1944
      • General Situation December 1944
    • Chapter 5 1945
    • General Situation January 1945
    • General Situation February 1945 Amsterdam:
    • General Situation March 1945
    • General Situation May, June and July 1945
  • Chapter 6 Dutch SOE General Evaluation
    • Morale
    • Propaganda
    • Enemy Forces
    • Collaborators
    • Organised Clandestine Groups
    • Introduction of London-trained Agents to Existing Groups
    • The Arrival of Individual Agents
    • Relations with local leaders
    • Achievements
    • Cover and Papers
    • Indigenous agents
    • London-trained agents
    • History of organisation
    • Grafting
    • Watermarks
    • Ration cards
    • Railway tickets
    • Production
    • Finance
    • Security
    • Informant’s activities prior to working with N.B.S
    • Cover
    • Organisation and Communications (Internal)
    • Security Precautions
    • Informant’s introduction to N.B.S
    • Informant’s work with Piet Van Arnhem
    • Enemy C.E
    • Escapee Pilots
    • Recruiting
    • Training
    • Operational Training
    • Security Training
    • Pay
    • Premises
    • Training Premises
    • W/T Sites
    • Secret Telephone Exchanges
    • Internal Communications
    • Couriers
    • Personal Meetings
    • Post
    • Telephones
    • External Communications
    • Wireless Transmission
    • Coding
    • Inter-Communication
    • T.D. System
    • T.D. in Holland
    • Security Precautions, Enemy C.E. and Casualtiesy
    • Security Precautions
    • Enemy C.E.: Controls
    • Enemy C.E.: Razzias
    • Enemy C.E.: House searches
    • Enemy C.E.: Informers and Street Watchers
    • Enemy C.E.: Surveillance
    • Enemy C.E.: Agents provocateurs
    • Enemy C.E.: Impersonation
    • Enemy C.E.: Penetration
    • Casualties
    • Note on the activities of Abwehr IIIF, The Hague, against S.O.E
  • Chapter 7 Evaluation of S.O.E. Operations in Holland
    • Container Operations
    • Agents and Casualties
    • Planning
    • Briefing
    • False Papers
    • D-Day Plans
    • Training
    • Despatch
    • Arrival
    • Amphibious Operations
    • Signal Communications
    • Codes and Cyphers
    • Secret Inks
    • Pigeons
    • S-phone
    • The reasons for failure in S.O.E. operations appear to have been:
  • Appendix ‘A’ Summary of Operation in the Netherlands
  • Plates
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