In Strange Company  
An American Soldier with Multinational Forces in the Middle East and Iraq
Published by Casemate
Publication Date:  Available in all formats
ISBN: 9781636243955
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ISBN: 9781636243955 Price: INR 562.99
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“Colonel Tiso’s experience with operational planning and combat service with multinational forces in Iraq provides an exceptional background for this riveting, exciting, and most interesting book that superbly captures the challenges of Coalition Warfare.” — Lieutenant General (Retired) Joseph W. Kinzer, USA

The decision to not deploy reoriented, trained Iraqi divisions and other allied forces in numbers significant enough to adequately stabilize the situation in Iraq in 2003–04 resulted in significant shortages of manpower and equipment that eventually led to a less-than-satisfactory ending to the campaign, and significantly challenged the entire Coalition effort in the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The roles and missions assumed by allies were vitally important in the under-resourced effort to bring order to the chaos of Iraq but would remain relatively unheralded throughout most of the campaign.

Colonel Tiso’s account of this time offers unique insights into the challenges of planning the Iraqi campaign and the intricacies and challenges of multinational service through the lens of his assignments as a war planner at U.S. Central Command, Senior Military Adviser of the Arab Peninsula Shield Force and the Polish-led Multinational Division (Central-South), and Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (C-3) of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team tasked to develop the New Iraqi Army. His observations cast significant light on the missions these units undertook and the challenges they confronted.

His firsthand account of operational planning for war in Iraq captures the concerns of the military planners and senior commanders to liberate and stabilize the country, enabling the reader to better understand the challenges of operational war planning, coalition warfare, the difficulty of stabilizing Iraq after the fall of Baghdad, the development of the New Iraqi Army, and ultimately a deeper understanding of America’s “long war” in Iraq.
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“Colonel Tiso’s experience with operational planning and combat service with multinational forces in Iraq provides an exceptional background for this riveting, exciting, and most interesting book that superbly captures the challenges of Coalition Warfare.” — Lieutenant General (Retired) Joseph W. Kinzer, USA

The decision to not deploy reoriented, trained Iraqi divisions and other allied forces in numbers significant enough to adequately stabilize the situation in Iraq in 2003–04 resulted in significant shortages of manpower and equipment that eventually led to a less-than-satisfactory ending to the campaign, and significantly challenged the entire Coalition effort in the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The roles and missions assumed by allies were vitally important in the under-resourced effort to bring order to the chaos of Iraq but would remain relatively unheralded throughout most of the campaign.

Colonel Tiso’s account of this time offers unique insights into the challenges of planning the Iraqi campaign and the intricacies and challenges of multinational service through the lens of his assignments as a war planner at U.S. Central Command, Senior Military Adviser of the Arab Peninsula Shield Force and the Polish-led Multinational Division (Central-South), and Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (C-3) of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team tasked to develop the New Iraqi Army. His observations cast significant light on the missions these units undertook and the challenges they confronted.

His firsthand account of operational planning for war in Iraq captures the concerns of the military planners and senior commanders to liberate and stabilize the country, enabling the reader to better understand the challenges of operational war planning, coalition warfare, the difficulty of stabilizing Iraq after the fall of Baghdad, the development of the New Iraqi Army, and ultimately a deeper understanding of America’s “long war” in Iraq.
Table of contents
  • Front Cover
  • Half-Title Page
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Foreword by General (Retired) Anthony C. Zinni, USMC
  • Author’s Notes and Acknowledgements
  • PART I: PLANNING AND TRAINING FOR WAR
    • 1 Multi-Cultural Experiences in Old New York
    • 2 United States Central Command and the Central Region
    • 3 Leading U.S. and Multinational Forces in the Sinai
    • 4 Fighting the Force-Protection Battle in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan
    • 5 Planning the Inevitable War
  • PART II: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM SPECIAL MISSIONS
    • 6 Staffing Posthostilities Operations
    • 7 Duty with the United Nations
    • 8 Stability Operations in Iraq
    • 9 Advising the Peninsula Shield Force
    • 10 Reconnaissance of the Rumaylah Oil Field
    • 11 Redeployment of the Peninsula Shield Force
    • 12 Assignment to the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team
    • 13 Building the Foundation of an Army
    • 14 Making the Most of Scant Resources
    • 15 Recruiting, Organizing, and Training the New Iraqi Army
  • PART III: SOLDIERING WITH THE MULTINATIONAL DIVISION (CENTRAL-SOUTH)
    • 16 Preparing for Duty with a Combat Division
    • 17 Serving with the Multinational Division (Central-South)
    • 18 The Challenges of Multinational Command
    • 19 The Power of the Theater Commander
    • 20 Patrolling with the Ukrainians on the Iranian Border
    • 21 Preparing the Occupation of Iraq
    • 22 Indications of a Growing Insurgency in Central-South Iraq
    • 23 Dealing with Generals
    • 24 The War Comes to the Multinational Division (Central-South)
    • 25 Defeating the Enemy with Overwhelming Force
    • 26 Fighting the Battle for Central-South Iraq
    • 27 Combat Action in Al-Kut
    • 28 The American Bureaucracy in Baghdad
    • 29 Developing a Strategy to Conduct the Long War
    • 30 False Hope for Peace in Iraq
    • 31 Christmas on the Iranian Border
    • 32 Terrorist Attack and Tragedy in Kerbelâ’
    • 33 Transitioning to a New Commander and Division Staff
    • 34 Teaching the New Command to Conduct Combat Operations
    • 35 A New Liaison Team Arrives at Camp Babylon
  • PART IV: GOING HOME: REFLECTIONS ON THE LONG WAR
    • 36 Going Home via Poland
    • 37 Epilogue
  • Glossary of Acronyms and Terms
  • Endnotes
  • About the Author
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