Despite the best efforts of a number of historians, many aspects of the ferocious struggle between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second World War remain obscure or shrouded in myth. One of the most persistent of these is the notion - largely created by many former members of its own officer corps in the immediate postwar period - that the German Army was a paragon of military professionalism and operational proficiency whose defeat on the Eastern Front was solely attributable to the amateurish meddling of a crazed former Corporal and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Red Army. A key pillar upon which the argument of German numerical-weakness vis-à-vis the Red Army has been constructed is the assertion that Germany was simply incapable of providing its army with the necessary quantities of men and equipment needed to replace its losses. In consequence, as their losses outstripped the availability of replacements, German field formations became progressively weaker until they were incapable of securing their objectives or, eventually, of holding back the swelling might of the Red Army.

This work seeks to address the notion of German numerical-weakness in terms of Germany's ability to replace its losses and regenerate its military strength, and assess just how accurate this argument was during the crucial first half of the Russo-German War (June 1941-June 1943).

Employing a host of primary documents and secondary literature, it traces the development and many challenges of the German Army from the prewar period until the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. It continues on to chart the first two years of the struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union, with a particular emphasis upon the scale of German personnel and equipment losses, and how well these were replaced. It also includes extensive examinations into the host of mitigating factors that both dictated the course of Germany's campaign in the East and its replacement and regeneration capabilities.

In contrast to most accounts of the conflict, this study finds that numerical-weakness being the primary factor in the defeat of the Ostheer - specifically as it relates to the strength and condition of the German units involved - has been overemphasized and frequently exaggerated. In fact, Germany was actually able to regenerate its forces to a remarkable degree with a steady flow of fresh men and equipment, and German field divisions on the Eastern Front were usually far stronger than the accepted narratives of the war would have one believe.

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Maps
• List of Tables
• Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
• Table of Military Ranks
• Series Editor’s Preface
• Introduction
• 1 Prequel to Götterdämmerung. Rebuilding the German Army: From Rearmament to the fall of France, 1919 to June 1940
• 2 Preparing for Barbarossa, June 1940 to June 1941
• 3 Barbarossa Unleashed: The Invasion of Russia, June to October 1941
• 4 Requiem for a Kriegsspiel: The Failure of Barbarossa and the Rebuilding of the Ostheer, November 1941 to June 1942
• 5 Resurgence. The Ostheer between June and November 1942
• 6 Catastrophe and Reconstitution on the Eastern Front, November 1942 to July 1943
• Conclusion
• Appendix
  • I Equipment Requirements of Independent Units belonging to the German Army on 1 October 1939
  • II Equipment Requirements of Independent Units of the German Army on 1 May 1940
  • III Equipment Requirements of Independent Units of the German Army on 1 June 1941
  • IV Estimated Strength of German Infantry and Motorised Infantry Battalions, 1941
  • V German Reinforcements to the Ostfront, October 1941 – June 1942
  • VI Estimated German Armour Strength on the Eastern Front, 1 July 1942
  • VII Divisional Personnel Shortages among the Ostheer, early September 1942
  • VIII Divisional Personnel Shortages among the Ostheer, early November 1942
  • IX Equipment Requirements of Independent Units belonging to the German Army, 1 October 1942
  • X Estimated Material Requirements of the Ersatzheer, October 1942
  • XI German Reinforcements sent to Southern Russia, December 1942 to June 1943
  • XII Status of Infantry Battalions with the 1. Panzerarmee and Armee Abteilung Hollidt, Late February 1943
  • XIII Authorized and Actual Divisional Equipment Holdings on the Eastern Front, 1 July 1943
  • XIV Arrival of Replacements and Divisional Shortages by 1 July 1943
• Bibliography