This publication is a revision of IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 8, Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats, published in 2008. The new publication provides updated guidance to States, their competent authorities and operators, and shippers and carriers on selecting, implementing and evaluating measures for addressing insider threats. It applies to any type of nuclear facility, notably nuclear power plants, research reactors and other nuclear fuel cycle facilities (e.g. enrichment plants, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants, storage facilities), whether in design, redesign, construction, commissioning, operation, shutdown or decommissioning.

• 1. INTRODUCTION
  • Background
  • Objective
  • Scope
  • Structure
• 2. IDENTIFICATION OF INSIDER THREATS
  • Attributes of insiders
  • Motivations of insiders
  • Categories of insiders
  • Identification of potential insider threats
• 3. TARGET IDENTIFICATION
  • Targets for unauthorized removal
  • Sabotage targets
  • Identification of systems that contribute to nuclear security
• 4. MEASURES AGAINST POTENTIAL INSIDER THREATS
  • General approach to implementation
  • Implementing measures against insider threats
    • Implementing preventive measures
    • Implementing protective measures
  • Comprehensive elements that reinforce preventive and protective measures
    • Nuclear security culture
    • Contingency plans
• 5. EVALUATION OF MEASURES
  • Objectives and overview of the evaluation process
  • Evaluation of preventive measures
  • Evaluation of protective measures
  • Evaluation of measures against collusion between insiders
  • Evaluation of measures against protracted theft
  • Evaluation of measures against sabotage
  • Evaluation of a facility for protection against insider threats
• REFERENCES