A new assessment of the Falklands War from the Argentine perspective.

In 1982, the United Kingdom and Argentina fought a war over an historical disagreement over the colonial “ownership” or rights over the Falkland Islands. Within months of the Argentinian defeat, General Edgardo Calvi, then the Argentine Head of the Army Joint Chief of Staff, was instructed to undertake a wide-ranging and formal inquiry to investigate the performance of the Argentine Army during the Falklands. Calvi concluded that while the Army had the motivation, it lacked the organization, equipment, training, and ability to oppose an army capable of operating in a variety of environments. The war exposed political, military, and public weaknesses in a period of considerable internal unrest during the seven years of the Dirty War. Several senior officers who fought in the Falklands were imprisoned for offenses committed during the Dirty War. Secrecy and political disagreements isolated the Service chiefs of staff from the logistic and operational planning. This book tells the story of the Falklands War from the Argentine Army perspective.

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Foreword
• Introduction
• 1 Planning the Recovery
• 2 Operation Rosario: Recovery of Las Malvinas
• 3 The Seizure of South Georgia
• 4 Malvinas Theatre of Operations
• 5 The South Atlantic Theatre of Operations
• 6 South Georgia: Operation Paraquat
• 7 Waiting for the Task Force
• 8 D-Day – 21 May – San Carlos Water Landings: Combat Team Güemes
• 9 The Battle of Goose Green
• 10 Battle for Mount Kent
• 11 Defence of the Outer Defence Zone: Mount Harriet
• 12 Defence of the Outer Defence Zone: Mount Longdon
• 13 Defence of the Outer Defence Zone: Two Sisters
• 14 The Inner Defence Zone: Mount Tumbledown
• 15 Defence of the Inner Defence Zone: Battle of Wireless Ridge
• 16 Surrender and the Final Battle
• 17 The Reckoning
• Endnotes